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Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you
                                                        St. Luke, 6:27
ABstrACt
This paper examines how the ancient Greek and 
Hellenistic notions of political ethics were incorporated 
within an evolving Christian thought which emphasized 
the importance of agape within a Universalist perspective. 
This evolution can be most clearly seen through the 
works of St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas who elaborated a 
doctrine involving the universality of Jesus’s message but 
with adaptation and evolution according to the historical 
circumstances. This process has deep contemporary resonances 
not only theologically but also in terms of social and political 
philosophy. I will argue that Pauline cosmopolitanism ends 
up setting legitimacy as the main criterion by which to assess 
governance and offer allegiance. The ethical demands of 
Christianity are very stringent. Accordingly, it would appear 
that, in order to fulfil those demands, whenever possible, 
Christians should seek the right sort of social and political 
context. This context was to be developed by St. Augustine 
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and St. Thomas Aquinas. Augustine held that the most one 
can reasonably expect from a political structure is that it 
should promote peace. And he viewed this central political 
task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of 
those forms of evils that most disturb civil tranquility. For 
Aquinas, on the other hand, political organization, chiefly 
through the instrumentality of human law, has the capacity 
of furthering, in a positive way, the natural aspects of the 
human function. 
introduction
Christian ethics stems from the teachings and the example offered 
by the life of Jesus combined with Judaic monotheism, Roman Stoicism 
and Greek philosophy. By creatively developing both a practical and an 
intellectual synthesis of these beliefs, Christian thought claimed to embody 
at first a critique and then increasingly the truest and most complete 
expression of their cultural legacy. While making these claims, Christianity 
advanced three basic principles concerning the conduct of human life: the 
first is that we are supposed to strive for spiritual salvation, in fellowship 
with the saved; the second is that we cannot achieve this salvation solely 
by our own individual or social efforts, but we also require the grace of 
God operating mainly by the guidance of the Church; the third is that in 
order to love God, you have to love your fellow human beings, and you 
have to love and care for the rest of creation. 
In the following sections, I will also point out how, in turn, these 
ethical and religious principles gave rise to a corresponding political 
philosophy, which over the millennia acquired an almost universal influence 
and relevance. My thesis is that the universality of this message lies in the 
fact that it does not embody a static doctrine but principles that are amenable 
to be adopted, adapted and progressively developed and actualized 
according to changing historical circumstances. St. Paul, Augustine and 
Aquinas, more than others, were instrumental in mediating between 
Christian core beliefs and the Greek and Hellenistic cultural legacy. 
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legitimacy and political universalism
The ethical precepts of St. Paul, like the ones of Hellenistic 
Stoicism, have a markedly universal range, and were instrumental in how 
the new Christians understood political legitimacy. Aristotle inherited 
from Protagoras the idea that nomos, or what is customary, conventional 
and cultural in society, can aid in the pursuit of eudaimonia, or individual 
flourishing. According to Aristotle, morality and politics to fully play their 
role in the construction of the virtuous citizen require a Greek identity, 
therefore becoming matters of local rather than universal concern and 
fruition. There are no criteria of government legitimacy behind its capacity 
to ensure effective and fair rule. In contrast to this, St. Paul and the Stoics 
were arguing for more universal concerns. The early Christian believed 
that fulfilling the human function is a matter of obtaining the right 
understanding about the universe, or creator and creation. Cosmopolitanism 
is thus connected with the establishment of some general, although as yet 
not very specific criteria for government legitimacy. 
For Christians, gaining the right insight about the world required 
correctly grasping and following the doctrines taught by the Church. 
Everything hanged on coming to understand, receive, willfully accept and 
implement the grace of God through the ecclesiastical administrations of 
the sacraments. This implied getting at least some rational grasp of the 
role of the Divine providence in achieving the proper human good and 
flourishing. But achieving such a rational insight about God’s creation 
also required understanding the functions that God attributed to legitimate 
rulers and governance. For this to happen, then all disorderly passions 
should be subjected to the control of a substantive notion of (practical) 
reason. The volitional faculty will thus became strong and make the 
faithful act only according to his/her new insight and correct belief in a 
process that has some resemblance to the Stoic concept of homologia. 
Achieving spiritual regeneration depends upon the personal efforts of the 
believer, rather than their enculturation. In other words, some form of 
secular polity is required for humans to achieve salvation. 
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Christian cosmopolitanism and universalism was concerned with 
defining the nature and boundaries of legitimate political rule and of 
the allegiance required by believers to the secular authority, and raised 
very profound questions about the proper role that secular political 
institutions have in promoting the Christian message and the purpose of 
human life. Thus, the new way of looking at things according to Pauline 
cosmopolitanism also saw legitimacy as the main criterion by which 
to assess governance and offer allegiance. Consequently, there were 
universal or cosmopolitan political suggestions in Christian doctrine which 
became criteria for legitimate endorsement or allegiance by the faithful. 
The fundamental Christian moral imperative to love one’s neighbour 
clearly has social and political implications. In regard to this, the ethical 
demands of Christianity are very stringent. Hearts must be changed in 
order to fulfil the Church’s mission in solidarity with the poor and for 
achieving the necessary structural changes in society which would give 
voice to the voiceless, as required by Christian agape.1 Accordingly, it 
would appear that, in order to fulfil those stringent demands, whenever 
possible, Christians should seek the right sort of social and political 
context. The desire to create a political context where demands for justice 
are made possible can thus become the criterion to assess the legitimacy of 
political institutions. Although, unfortunately, these demands have largely 
remained unfulfilled, and their effective political implementation has 
been mostly discouraged by the majority of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that, because of Christ’s 
and St Paul’s teachings, at least in principle, a criterion of legitimacy 
based on the delivery of justice to the needy has always been formally 
maintained. 
This has inspired countless examples of dedication to the cause 
of the poor epitomized by figures such as St Francis of Assisi, more 
recently Mother Teresa of Calcutta, and many of their less famous 
followers. However, these noble endeavours have mostly (but not always 
exclusively) concerned the all important practical ethical activity on 
behalf of the needy in the social sphere, but without directly calling to 
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task the powers that be by questioning their legitimacy to rule for their 
lack of support for the poor. 
Reversing this almost apolitical trend, Liberation Theology, by 
reinterpreting early Pauline thought, may have significantly contributed 
to a renewed sensitivity to the idea of distributive justice as a measure 
to evaluate the legitimacy of existing political institutions. Moreover, 
these demands for social justice, now, both within and without Liberation 
Theology, are no longer confined merely to the economic sphere. Indeed, 
these pressing demands are becoming increasingly wedded to a quest for 
democratic rule by governments chosen by free and fair elections and to 
a quest for a broader respect of human rights within liberal constitutional 
frameworks. 
So Liberation Theology saw salvation as something achieved not 
only through faith, but through concrete action against poverty, injustice 
and other human rights abuses. Interestingly, new readings of St Paul were 
made not only by progressive or leftist Christian believers and theologians 
such as Gustavo Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, Giovanni Franzoni, Hans 
Küng, and John Milbank, but also by so called secular non-believers of 
Marxist orientation such as Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Zizek. According to 
Badiou, St Paul combines truth and subjectivity in a way that continues 
to be relevant for us living in the 21st century; allegedly, he does so by 
simultaneously overcoming both the ritual strictures of Judaic Law and 
the formal rational conventions of the Greek Logos. In other words, 
St Paul plants a revolutionary seed by making the subject of the conversion 
to Christianity undertake a radical and dramatic change that leads them 
to reject the order of the world as it is, with its present injustices, and 
strive for a new world dominated by Christian agape.2 In other words, 
all traditional interpretations of St Paul are turned upside down, and the 
existing power structures of society are deprived of any moral legitimacy, 
and their subjects, following their inner transformation as believers in 
Christ, are mandated to create a new social and political order.3
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Moreover, according to this ‘subversive’ interpretation of early 
Pauline thought, the fundamental principles of Aristotelian ethics and 
politics were completely rejected or reinterpreted, by the early Christian 
base communities. In particular, Aristotle’s application of his very notion 
of phronesis had to be changed, if conversion to the new faith was 
to be meaningful. For Aristotle, the apogee of practical reason, when 
applied to the art of governance, was supposed to be the understanding 
of how to avoid situations of radical crisis in order to preserve stable 
constitutional systems. But, according to Liberation Theology, as 
Leonardo Boff points out, Christian agape mandates a totally different 
attitude from the classical Aristotelian one. Following from the 
conversion, and spiritual rebirth in Christ, prudence is now supposed 
to become the understanding of situations of radical crisis, and thus to 
indicate a new search for wisdom and insight, which does not avoid, but 
shares in the pain of the victims.4 This implies a total transformation and 
a sort of rebirth, in that the believer in Christ must actively seek situations 
of crisis to immerse herself in. It also means being in solidarity with the 
poor. This is of course a very radical and revolutionary message, which 
implies a rejection of the political status quo in so far as there is oppression, 
poverty, exploitation and injustice in society. It follows that political 
legitimacy would be conditional on the powers-that-be showing effective 
action against all injustices. In other words, according to this politically 
radical interpretation, the Christian agape advocated by St Paul mandates 
a ‘preferential option for the poor’, with all its ethico-political implications, 
also as far as political legitimacy is concerned.5
Badiou’s thesis, and indeed some tenets of radical versions of 
Liberation Theology remain highly controversial (in particular, their 
tight ideological wedding with Marxism, and association with messianic 
political millenarianism), but there is no doubt that the problem of how 
to create a social and political context conducive to the exercise of the 
Christian theological virtues necessary for salvation (faith, hope and 
love), was high on the agenda also of the more traditional interpretations 
of Pauline thought.
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Indeed, specific concerns about how to develop a social context 
conducive to the fulfilment of the stringent ethical demand to love one’s 
neighbour sets what were to become the two most historically influential 
answers to the questions about the role of the political structures for the 
life of Christians. These answers were developed by St. Augustine and 
St. Thomas Aquinas. Most starkly put, Augustine held that the most one 
can reasonably expect from a political structure is that it should promote, 
to a greater or lesser degree, peace. And he tended to view this central 
political task negatively – as the suppression of anarchy and of those 
forms of evils that most disturb civil tranquility. Thus, he set a very limited 
criterion of political legitimacy. For Aquinas, on the other hand, political 
organization, chiefly through the instrumentality of human law, has the 
capacity of furthering, in a more direct or positive way, at least the natural 
aspects of the human function. He thus set a wider criterion of political 
legitimacy. However, there is a sense in which the magisterial works of 
the two greatest Christian philosophers were only drawing two possible, 
but different conclusions already more implicitly and less systematically 
set by the Apostolic and Pauline criteria for political legitimacy, which 
in turn were only partly novel, finding some roots and correspondence in 
earlier as well as contemporary Roman eclectic Stoicism. Both Augustine 
and Aquinas together with other saintly figures, like St. Francis of 
Assisi, constitute the spiritual heirs of Pauline and apostolic thought on 
ethics and/or politics (but St. Francis took a more practical approach). 
But, unfortunately, as in all human matters, together with these noble 
legacies, there is also a darker side concerning the political consequences 
of the new Christian way of looking into things. As soon as it became 
dominant ‘the new way’ was hijacked for more expedient purposes than 
the original evangelical ones and religion became a tool in the hands of 
the powers that be. 
But the question is: what caused the Church over the centuries 
to underestimate the gospel’s core message, which is love (agape)? 
The answer may lie in the fact that, after the emperors Constantine and 
Theodosius embraced Christianity, in the fourth century, it instilled a 
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spirit of power and dominance. However, the full effects of this corrupting 
attitude can be most clearly and famously seen at work much later in the 
Crusades, Inquisition, and other tragic bloody events constituting the dark 
side of European history. Many members of the church, including some 
leaders like Pope Gregory VII, tried heroically, but unsuccessfully, to stop 
this trend. And yet conversely, European rulers were successful in taking 
advantage of the situation, by staking their legitimacy on their claim to 
universal moral authority and religious orthodoxy. The consequence of 
this was that, by extension, all those who were not religiously orthodox 
were considered suspect, persecuted and, in some cases, eliminated. 
Thus, first, the pagans were targeted, then the Muslim and Jewish 
communities, then the heretical Christian groups. The reformation led to 
a series of bloody wars. More recently, some secularized ideologies, like 
Fascism and Stalinism, which emerged in the last century at least in part 
as a reaction or consequence of these events. 
The Roman Catholic Church reacted to these tragic events 
especially in the 1960s, by elaborating its own program of renewal and 
reform, which, through the Second Vatican Council, manifested the intent 
of opening up itself more to the modern world, and by developing some 
new and more inclusive doctrines that eschewed the intolerant practices 
of the past. Accordingly, the mission of all Catholics is defined as to show 
people how to see the love of God, while at the same time not imposing 
it on them. This requires the correct application of the Golden Rule of 
doing unto others as you would like them to do unto you. In the same 
fashion, the current Pope Francis is delivering a universal message of 
forgiveness, reason and tolerance aimed at reaching the hearts and minds 
of all throughout the world, without making any distinction between 
race, political stance, or religious creed. According to him, the main 
challenge facing the church today is not simply to resolve long standing 
controversial issues like celibacy of the clergy, admission to sacraments 
of the divorced, etc., but to relearn how to communicate a deeper, more 
intelligent and relevant religion that leads to a life of acceptance and love.
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Pope Francis’ position remains loyal to the traditional theological, 
ethical and political teachings of the Catholic Church. These doctrines 
were inherited from St. Paul and the Apostolic thought of the late classical 
antiquity, and also from the Church’s two most influential philosophers: 
Augustine and Aquinas, who developed the two main political implications 
of the Christian conception of human nature, or human purpose. I will 
next examine more in detail the specific contribution that each of the 
two have respectively given to the development of Christian, and more 
in general to Western political philosophy. 
Augustine’s political pragmatism
Augustine introduces the contrast between the concept of enjoyment 
(which refers to the Latin word fructus) and the one of use (referring to 
usus). Whereas enjoyment pertains to that which per se brings about 
happiness, use refers conceptually to that which is supposed to aid us 
in achieving what will make us happy and achieve a blessed state. Alas, 
Augustine laments, we tend to strive for the objects of use, and not our 
own ultimate aim, or telos.6But even worse, we often strive to enjoy what 
we should altogether avoid even as object of use (and sexual misconduct 
constitutes a major embodiment of this fault, according to Augustine). 
Thus, there are two different kinds of people: the blessed ones who succeed 
in enjoying the love of God, and are to be saved at the end of time, and 
the “fallen” ones who improperly enjoy the world.
However, according to Augustine, the two civitates, where these 
two different kinds of people (figuratively) inhabit, are not cities in a literal 
sense, and are not to be identified with any specific historical, social or 
political institution. This means that the earthly city does not coincide 
with the Roman Empire nor with any other existing or future secular 
state, while the heavenly city cannot coincide with the (Catholic) Church. 
They cannot coincide because, on the one hand, those who love the world 
can be found both in the state and in the church, and, on the other hand, 
there are some in the state who love God. Therefore, the two civitates cut 
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across both worlds achieving independence of them in an invisible way. 
That is to say, whenever and wherever there are people who love God, 
there is the Heavenly city, and conversely the Earthly City whenever and 
wherever there are those who love the world. Nevertheless, the Church 
instituted by Christ the Saviour still resonates with the power of His love, 
and therefore constitutes the most natural, although not exclusive, home 
of those belonging to the Heavenly City.   
Augustine thought that the tension between these two cities 
offered him not only the key for his own personal understanding of 
history, but also the divine logic of salvation. This logic involved the 
need to reconcile humanity to its creator through the saving acts and the 
sacraments instituted by Christ. It also explains why Augustine reacted 
so strongly against the views of the Celtic thinker Pelagius who thought 
that Christians are not infected with original sin and hence not giving, to 
Augustine’s dismay, a central role to God’s grace.7 According to Augustine, 
humans inherit from Adam the propensity to sin, and our freedom consists 
only in the way in which the divine providence may draw us to the 
good. We are incapable to achieve goodness except through God’s grace. 
Augustine was at pain to escape the conclusion that either God brings 
about or that there is a separate source of evil. As he had earlier abandoned 
Manichaean dualism, he developed a theory which derived from Neo-
Platonism, the idea that all that exists comes from God and that evil 
therefore cannot exist, it is the absence of good. It follows that humans 
are free to choose evil, but when they do so, they are not under the direct 
influence of the grace of God. 
Moreover, Augustine thought that individual good and evil should 
be seen in the wider context of society in what became a major contribution 
to political thought about the relation between the Church and the State. 
Thus, as it appears from the following passage, the contrast between the 
earthly and the heavenly answered to his eschatological views concerning 
his philosophy of history: 
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In this wicked world,… in these evil times, the Church 
through her present humiliation is preparing for future 
exaltation … In this situation, many reprobates are mingled 
in the Church with the good, and both sorts are collected, 
as it were, in the dragnet of the gospel … and enclosed 
in nets until the shore is reached. There the evil are to be 
divided from the good.8 
It follows from this that, unfortunately, until the final judgment 
it is not possible to precisely identify the two cities and their spiritual 
dwellers, beyond the general guidance provided by the Bible. 
The earthly city or Babylon, which was ruled by self-interest rather 
than by Christian charity or agape, could be akin to the Assyria of the 
Old Testament. However, Augustine did not intend to precisely associate 
it with the Roman state, whilst at the same time also not endorsing the 
opposite view that considered the Empire as the main instrument for the 
onward transmission of the faith. But he did fully endorse the view that 
the state should be fully subservient to the Church, in so far as the latter 
was an imperfect embodiment of the heavenly city. The state could thus 
be used as an instrument to suppress the existing heresies. And Augustine 
somewhat reluctant support for the bloody suppression of Donatism had 
fateful consequences for the subsequent history of the Church, and its 
intolerance for intellectual dissent.9 Perhaps, Augustine, who also used 
various arguments, including an earlier proto-version of Descartes’ cogito 
ergo sum to confute the scepticism influencing the Academy, could have 
been a little bit more open to the kind of intellectual freedom which he 
himself had enjoyed earlier on. But as the situation was developing, the 
times were not yet ripe for that. The relative tolerance of antiquity was 
coming to end, and the medieval dark ages were inexorably approaching. 
Augustine still belonged to the late imperial civilization, and the synthesis 
which he constructed between revelatory and philosophical concepts 
remains one of the greatest intellectual achievements in the history of the 
Church. Thus, the theoretical political consequences he draws from the 
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exercise of the temporal power have to be seen in the light of this synthesis 
between the revelatory and the philosophical, and of his eschatological 
concerns about the ends of human history.
Accordingly, the theory of the two cities led Augustine to believe 
that the state is not, on its own, supposed to advocate or endorse any 
particular world view, ideology or organic conception of how society 
should be organized. Indeed, as a temporary human institution with a 
limited scope and range of competencies it should not have any particular 
ultimate historical mission, beyond maintaining peace and public order. 
The prevention of major social turmoil and unrest, together with the 
punishment of crimes, and restraint for the would be offenders, is the 
most that members of the heavenly city can expect as the outcome of 
the administration of the temporal power. To put it bluntly, the spiritual 
inhabitants of the civitas peregrina must always bear in mind that all 
human institutions are fallible because they are morally incapacitated as 
the result of the original sin.
Augustine consequently, was skeptical about the feasibility of 
finding political solutions to human problems. However paradoxically, 
this seemingly discouraging skepticism, pessimism, or realism about 
the capacity of secular governments to promote human redemption has 
far-reaching theoretical consequences, providing some positive, however 
limited suggestions about how to organize public policies. It is indeed such 
a prudential skepticism that leads Augustine to draw a distinction of sorts 
between private morality and public law, a distinction which also renders 
him extremely wary of endorsing the ideal of the state as a promoter of 
the personal virtue of its members. It also inspires him to pragmatically 
consider secular governments as providers of ‘neutral means’, which can 
be used by citizens who do not share the same ultimate concerns.  
This may seem, prima facie, and perhaps with a bit of a stretch of 
imagination, to anticipate the political neutrality of the state advocated 
by some versions of modern liberalism. Accordingly, it is not uncommon 
to find political theorists assuming that Augustinian thought does in fact 
foreshadow some features of the liberal conception of the state, which 
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together with political and religious neutrality predicates also the distinction 
between private morality and public law.10 Nevertheless, any such 
comparison needs to take into account they involve different notions of 
political justice. 
On the one hand, Augustine, unlike liberalism, does not develop 
a fully-fledged political theory centered on a notion of human justice. 
But he merely provides suggestions for prudential and pragmatic 
accommodations with what he regards as necessarily morally flawed, and 
thus intrinsically inadequate, government of temporal matters. According 
to Augustine, the most that can be expected from the state is a kind 
of equity according to which power is exercised not arbitrarily, but in 
conformity with those relatively vague principles of natural justice and 
dictates of conscience which even the wretched earthly city members may 
have some inkling. On the other hand, liberalism develops a fully fledged 
political theory centered on a notion of justice. Thus, the liberal theory 
of justice is based on a principle of equality prescribing as a normative 
principle, a certain degree of political, ideological, religious neutrality 
or impartiality by the state out of respect for the different, but morally 
equal, interests and identities of its members. This is not a political priority 
for Augustine, even though it may be a moral corollary of Christian 
agape.11 Accordingly, the Augustinian conception of the task of temporal 
and therefore secular politics is much more modest and limited, even 
though not radically at odds with Rousseau’s inspired ideals of liberty, 
equality and fraternity. This is because for Augustine, a certain state 
non-interference in the private life of people is more a matter of prudential 
considerations, which could be adjusted or even withdrawn according 
to circumstances and changing historical situations rather than a strict 
prescriptive doctrine. This political pragmatism, was in the service of 
the Christian philosophy of history, which was announcing an imminent 
parousia. The result of this discrepancy is that the world has currently 
turned into a space of contestation between two differing sets of ethics 
also with diverging political implications: the first is the liberal ethics of 
autonomy, according to which people are primarily autonomous individuals 
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with subjective and specific wants, needs and desires; the other is the 
more traditional conservative and politically more authoritarian ethics of 
divinity/community, where people attain meaning as members of larger 
entities such as families or communities of faith.
However, Augustine does not attribute great importance or priority 
to a ‘positive’ political or legal doctrine. Unlike the case of contemporary 
liberal political theory stemming from John Locke, Augustine does not 
construct a theory of governance in which a degree of political, religious 
and ideological neutrality, together with freedom of thought and 
expression, and the distinction between moral and legal obligations figure 
as necessary conditions for the exercise of legitimate political authority. 
For Augustine, these are not fundamental principles, but could at best 
be practical conditions offering members of the city of God the best 
opportunity to fulfil their function and spread the divine message. But the 
Augustinian philosophy of history makes Christian wisdom and secular 
power under the most favorable conditions very uneasy partners, and 
more often than not in downright disagreement on how to conduct human 
affairs. According to Augustine, it may be superficially true that some 
polities are better than others, but what really matters is that none of them, 
by their own temporal and limited nature, will ever be able to satisfy our 
deepest and everlasting aspirations. This points to the fact that, at least in 
the deepest meaning of the concept, man, for Augustine, is not the political 
animal described by Aristotle, but a divine creature who can only fulfill 
his ultimate telos by rejoining God. Thus, the heavenly city to which 
all humans are summoned is very distant not only from the Aristotelian 
ideal polis but also from any existing political community. It is left to 
Thomas Aquinas to try to fill the gap between this ideal Augustinian 
spiritual polity, which is far removed from earthly considerations, and 
the practical demands of our own political, biological and mortal life. 
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Aquinas’ Christianized ethico-political Aristotelianism
…Whatsoever is a means of preserving human life, and of 
warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law… Man 
has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and 
to live in society… Aquinas12 
  
Aquinas recognizes a natural sphere of rational and ethical values, 
universally applicable to all believers and non-believers. This universally 
known rational standard of justice is what he calls natural law. But to 
fully account for the coherence and organic unity of his rational 
understanding of the contiguity, even though not identity, that he postulated 
between politics and theodicy, thus significantly altering the Augustinian 
paradigm. It is essential to refer, at least briefly, to Aquinas’ famous systematic 
description of four types of laws:
The first is the eternal law, which consists in the plan of Government 
in God. All other laws, in so far as they accord with right reason, derive 
from it.
The second is the divine law as set forth in the Holy Scriptures, 
which serves as additional guidance to those commands of natural law 
known by all rational men.
The third is natural law, which, with some Aristotelian connotations, 
for Aquinas applies only to humans as conscious, rational, moral, social 
creatures, teaching them to seek self-preservation, avoid ignorance and not 
give offence to or harm others with whom they associate. Thus, unique to 
men is their natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in 
society. For this reason, he assumes that humans are naturally religious, 
and share one standard of truth and rightness. However, the specific 
circumstances where standards of truth are applied vary, and therefore, 
so does natural law. Therefore, Aquinas argues that as history changes, 
progressing towards its ultimate end, secondary precepts and conclusions 
derived from the immutable first principles may also vary. This is 
consistent with the idea that the world historical evolution is to be seen as 
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the gradual unfolding of a divinely ordained plan. Thus, Aquinas’ theory 
of natural law allows him to reinterpret more optimistically Augustine’s 
philosophy of history without directly contradicting it.
The fourth type is human law, which is promulgated by the rulers of 
the community, according to the political regime governing the state. While 
the natural law establishes that its transgressors shall be punished, it is the 
positive human law which determines the specific penalty. However, as 
positive enactment it has the quality of law in so far as it proceeds according 
to reason. It is further divided by Aquinas into the law of nations (ius 
gentium), similar to what we may call today international law, and civil 
law (ius civilis), i.e. the specific laws of each single country. Accordingly, 
the former concerns the general norms governing buying and selling, and 
the other activities necessary to social exchange in all countries; the latter 
comprises the particular applications of the natural law to local conditions. 
Concerning the three forms of government described by Aristotle, Aquinas 
is mostly in favor of monarchy, but in true Aristotelian spirit, one that 
shares at least some features of a mixed government with the other two 
forms, especially with aristocracy, and even with democracy. One of the 
advantages of such a mixed monarchical rule is that the consequent division 
of power involved makes it clear that there is never a right to depose or 
kill a tyrant because such an action should only be undertaken by a public 
authority, preferably under the moral, spiritual and even political guidance 
of the Church. In any case, Aquinas prudently argues, the toppling of tyrants 
should be avoided if the disorder or scandal resulting from such move is 
likely to result in a greater harm than that already existing. But besides 
preventing and punishing the various human mischief and evil doings, 
civil law should actively contribute to the virtue and well being of citizens. 
And with regard to the promotion of the people’s welfare, Aquinas points 
out that the human agreement enshrined in positive law also determines 
the rights of private property, which has a utilitarian purpose. Property, 
therefore, while permissible and natural in moderate quantity, should 
not be accumulated superabundantly, and usury always shunned. Most 
significantly, in conformity with Christian agape, help for the poor and 
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needy should be ensured and promoted by the public authority according 
to natural right, and in cooperation with the Church.
But the theme of the promotion of agape brings in wider questions 
concerning moral and political philosophy also discussed elsewhere in 
Summa Theologiae. Aquinas is well aware that when more than two people 
are involved, the expression of love involves being fair to each of them. 
This not only frames questions of corrective and distributive justice, but 
even the issue concerning the justification of conflict. In regard to this, he 
discusses the rudiments of a doctrine of just war in his detailed treatment 
of love or agape.13 For Aquinas, love presupposes justice, even when 
transcending it; otherwise it would degenerate into sentimentality. 
Paradoxically, those who mean well commit some of the worst sins 
against love. As the old saying goes, the roads to hell are often paved with 
good intentions. Accordingly, Aquinas lists three conditions for waging 
a just war. By quoting Augustine, he argues that it must be declared by a 
legitimate authority, a just cause is required, and the belligerent should 
have a rightful intention. In this context, he quotes the biblical exhortation 
to “rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner.”14 
On the other hand, Aquinas also points out that Aristotle’s 
supposition that the state could provide everything that the people need, 
was based on his ignorance of the divine revelation contained in the Holy 
Scriptures. Taking care of these needs, is definitely important, and leads 
to proper human flourishing, but it is insufficient. This aspiration qualifies 
human nature in a different way than in Aristotle’s philosophy.15 In 
regard to this, Aquinas thought that the state it is not equipped to provide 
precise direction concerning how to achieve our ultimate ends, only the 
Church can do this. Thus, the former is supposed to be subordinate to 
the latter. Nevertheless, the State still maintains the important legitimate 
function of providing for the natural ends of the human existence. This 
function makes it relatively, but not absolutely autonomous from the 
Church, which is supposed to deal with the praeter-natural ends. Here, in 
particular, Aquinas departs from Aristotle in that he thought that besides 
the natural and the human law, people should be directed to their end by 
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a law, prophetically delivered by God, found in the Holy Scriptures. This 
is the divine law that is not the product of human reason, but is granted to 
us through the creator’s grace and mercy to help us know how to fulfill 
our natural and, especially, our praeter-natural destiny. Consequently, 
the difference between the natural and the divine law consists in that 
the former embodies our rational understanding of the good by which 
our practical reason, in Aristotelian fashion, directs our wills to control 
our appetites and passions, thus leading us to fulfill our natural end by 
achieving the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and 
fortitude. Therefore, Aquinas, on the one hand, subscribes to Aristotle’s 
view that virtue is that by which one lives well. On the other hand, by 
the means of the divine law, which comes directly from God through the 
gift of revelation, we are directed to our supernatural destiny by receiving 
the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and agape or love (in Latin: 
Fides, Spes, Caritas). This means that the theological virtues are infused 
into human nature by divine grace, and are not the result solely of our 
own human capabilities, although they surpass and complete them. In 
this way, Aquinas accomplishes the no mean task of superseding Aristotle 
without directly contradicting him. He does so by describing how our 
highest nature is perfected through the grace of God.
But, apart from his unrivalled greatness as a moral theologian, 
Aquinas’ philosophical doctrines also prefigured the various later Western 
secular and progressive liberal, utilitarian and democratic theorists, and 
especially by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy 
Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Marx, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls. 
These doctrines were:
1. The principle of the natural moral equality of all humans in 
terms of rights and duties.
2. The political importance of the no harm principle. 
3. The theory of the separate sphere of authority for the Church 
State.
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4. A conception of the limits of sovereign power, and of the 
state in general.
5. The idea that law must be directed towards the common good 
and must be fair to all, justly distributing burdens and benefits 
(distributive justice) and rectifying the wrongs (commutative 
justice).
6. And finally, he introduced the concept that the source of 
human law is fundamentally the whole people, and only 
derivatively any authority acting on their behalf.
     
Conclusion
I want to throw open the windows of the Church so that we 
can see out and the people can see in.
(sentence famously attributed to St. John XXIII16)
The legacy of the universalist doctrine developed by St Paul, 
Augustine and Aquinas can be seen in the slowly changing reactions of the 
upper echelons of the Catholic Church towards death penalty, liberalism, 
modernism, and, especially after the Vatican Council II, liberation 
theology. With regard to the progressively mutating positions involved, it is 
possible to make a significant comparison with the much earlier changing 
attitudes towards classical thought. The ancient pagan Greek and 
Hellenistic thought was initially viewed with a certain amount of suspicion, 
if not utter rejection, by the early Church but then became increasingly 
incorporated in the mainstream teachings and eventually even theology. 
In the same fashion, political and theological tendencies inspired by 
liberalism, modernism and liberation theology, were initially condemned 
by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. However, these philosophies or 
religious interpretations are now being progressively adapted, and, in some 
cases, even wholly adopted by the officially approved papal theology. 
It is my hope that, once again, these progressive changes will motivate 
people to act socially and politically with renewed energy in favor of 
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liberty, democracy, social and cultural progress, and, especially, against 
poverty and injustice. This means taking decisive action to uphold the 
notion of universal human rights, as well as rights extended to all sentient 
beings, to the earth itself, and parts of God’s creation. Christian theology 
decisively contributed to establish the theoretical underpinning of this 
extended notion of “human rights”, to which secularists and people of 
other faiths have also significantly contributed. Alas, the full unfolding 
of the implications of this theory, and its practical implementation is a 
long, complex, process, but one which can provide inspiration to those 
who strive for justice. Yet, in terms of magnitude, this process today has 
striking similarities to the task undertaken by the great theologians like 
St Paul, Augustine and Aquinas as they transformed the ancient Greek 
and Hellenistic pagan cultural heritage.  
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